Welfare effects of automatic‐IRAs
Contemporary Economic Policy · 2023-04 · 41 (2) · 300-318
DOI: 10.1111/coep.12600 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Contemporary Economic Policy, online erschienen am 25.11.2022. Verfasst von Erin Cottle Hunt. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Several states require employers who do not offer retirement benefits to automatically enroll their employees in individual retirement accounts (IRAs). We quantify the welfare effects of this program for individuals who follow a rule‐of‐thumb to make savings decisions. We find workers who save more than 3% would be willing to give up 0%–1.4% of lifetime consumption to avoid an IRA. We also consider a fully rational model with credit frictions, stochastic income and pre‐retirement withdrawals, and costly IRA opt‐outs. We find that being enrolled in an IRA is most likely to benefit workers who do not borrow during the life‐cycle.
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APA
Hunt, E. C. (2023). Welfare effects of automatic‐IRAs. Contemporary Economic Policy, 41(2), 300-318. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12600
Vancouver
Hunt EC. Welfare effects of automatic‐IRAs. Contemporary Economic Policy. 2023;41(2):300-318. doi:10.1111/coep.12600
BibTeX
@article{Hunt2023,
author = {Hunt, Erin Cottle},
title = {Welfare effects of automatic‐IRAs},
journal = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
year = {2023},
volume = {41},
number = {2},
pages = {300--318},
doi = {10.1111/coep.12600}
}
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