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Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?

Justin Callais, Andrew T. Young

Contemporary Economic Policy · 2021-10 · 39 (4) · 808-830

DOI: 10.1111/coep.12533 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Contemporary Economic Policy, online erschienen am 02.04.2021. Verfasst von Justin Callais und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 99 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

A growing number of studies explore the determinants of economic freedom. Very few of them consider constitutional design. We study entrenchment, that is, the extent to which constitutions are more costly to change than ordinary policies and institutions. We utilize 1970–2017 data and study episodes where countries adopted meaningfully more entrenched constitutions. Using matching methods, we construct plausible counterfactuals against which to compare their post‐treatment changes in economic freedom. We report no significant effects on overall freedom. There is some evidence that entrenchment leads to smaller government size, more regulation, and weaker property rights. However, none of these results are robust.

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APA

Callais, J., & Young, A. T. (2021). Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?. Contemporary Economic Policy, 39(4), 808-830. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12533

Vancouver

Callais J, Young AT. Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?. Contemporary Economic Policy. 2021;39(4):808-830. doi:10.1111/coep.12533

BibTeX
@article{Callais2021,
  author = {Callais, Justin and Young, Andrew T.},
  title = {Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?},
  journal = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {39},
  number = {4},
  pages = {808--830},
  doi = {10.1111/coep.12533}
}
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