PARTY CUES, POLITICAL TRENDS, AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Contemporary Economic Policy · 2019-10 · 37 (4) · 600-620
DOI: 10.1111/coep.12421 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Contemporary Economic Policy, online erschienen am 05.03.2019. Verfasst von J. Sebastian Leguizamon und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Recent theoretical and empirical research has suggested that similarities in party affiliations across space will alter voters' comparisons, thus influencing fiscal policy mimicking. We employ a two‐regime spatial panel data model applied to U.S. state governors from 1970 to 2012, and find rather weak empirical evidence of influence of political party affiliations in fiscal yardstick competition. Our observed cross‐state interdependence in fiscal policies suggests voters may not weigh party affiliation heavily in their measure of comparative quality, treating each incumbent individually and independently. Incumbents strategically choose policy accordingly. This provides indirect support for the median voter theorem, in which incumbents' objective function is to maximize votes, independent of political affiliation. ( JEL D72, H2, H7)
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APA
Leguizamon, J. S., & Kuscevic, C. M. M. (2019). PARTY CUES, POLITICAL TRENDS, AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. Contemporary Economic Policy, 37(4), 600-620. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12421
Vancouver
Leguizamon JS, Kuscevic CMM. PARTY CUES, POLITICAL TRENDS, AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. Contemporary Economic Policy. 2019;37(4):600-620. doi:10.1111/coep.12421
BibTeX
@article{Leguizamon2019,
author = {Leguizamon, J. Sebastian and Kuscevic, Casto Martin Montero},
title = {PARTY CUES, POLITICAL TRENDS, AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES},
journal = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
year = {2019},
volume = {37},
number = {4},
pages = {600--620},
doi = {10.1111/coep.12421}
}
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