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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story

Sara Biancini, David Ettinger, Baptiste Venet

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique · 2024-02 · 57 (1) · 225-242

DOI: 10.1111/caje.12694 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, online erschienen am 12.11.2023. Verfasst von Sara Biancini und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We suggest an explanation for the existence of “mission drift,” the tendency for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to lend money to wealthier borrowers rather than to the very poor. We focus on the relationship between MFIs and external funding institutions. We assume that both the MFIs and the funding institutions are pro‐poor. However, asymmetric information on the effort chosen by the MFI to identify higher‐quality projects may increase the share of loans attributed to wealthier borrowers. This occurs because funding institutions have to build incentives for MFIs, creating a trade‐off between the quality of the funded projects and the attribution of loans to poorer borrowers.

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APA

Biancini, S., Ettinger, D., & Venet, B. (2024). When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 57(1), 225-242. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12694

Vancouver

Biancini S, Ettinger D, Venet B. When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique. 2024;57(1):225-242. doi:10.1111/caje.12694

BibTeX
@article{Biancini2024,
  author = {Biancini, Sara and Ettinger, David and Venet, Baptiste},
  title = {When pro‐poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {57},
  number = {1},
  pages = {225--242},
  doi = {10.1111/caje.12694}
}
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