Rejecting conspiracies doesn't necessarily mean that you're smart: The relationship between conspiracy discrimination and reasoning ability
British Journal of Social Psychology · 2026-10 · 65 (4)
DOI: 10.1111/bjso.70117 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift British Journal of Social Psychology, online erschienen am 23.08.2026. Verfasst von Samuel G Robson und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Thinking, Politics, Trust, Cognition. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Research examining the psychological predictors of conspiracy belief has overwhelmingly examined conspiracies that are unverified and/or implausible. Doing so potentially conflates ‘rational’ thinking with the tendency to heuristically reject conspiracist explanations. In three studies, we take a different approach, examining the predictors of the accuracy with which people can discriminate between unverified conspiracy theories and verified conspiracies (i.e. conspiracies that form part of the official record). The ability to discriminate between unverified and verified conspiracies was consistently higher among those with greater cognitive sophistication, as well as among political liberals, those lower in conspiracy mentality, and those with higher trust in experts, whereas associations with demographic variables were mixed. Conspiracy discrimination was also a much stronger predictor of cognitive sophistication than heuristic acceptance of conspiracy claims (response bias). In fact, good discriminators outperformed those who heuristically reject conspiracies (‘Indiscriminate Sceptics’) and those who heuristically endorse conspiracies (‘Indiscriminate Believers’) on each measure of cognitive sophistication. These findings challenge the idea that rejecting conspiracies is necessarily a sign of superior reasoning.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
- School of Business, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
- School of Psychology, Adelaide University, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia.
ORCID-Profile: Matthew J Hornsey
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APA
Robson, S. G., Martire, K. A., Pearson, S., Cosgrove, T. J., Jetten, J., Faasse, K., & Hornsey, M. J. (2026). Rejecting conspiracies doesn't necessarily mean that you're smart: The relationship between conspiracy discrimination and reasoning ability. British Journal of Social Psychology, 65(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70117
Vancouver
Robson SG, Martire KA, Pearson S, Cosgrove TJ, Jetten J, Faasse K, et al. Rejecting conspiracies doesn't necessarily mean that you're smart: The relationship between conspiracy discrimination and reasoning ability. British Journal of Social Psychology. 2026;65(4). doi:10.1111/bjso.70117
BibTeX
@article{Robson2026,
author = {Robson, Samuel G and Martire, Kristy A and Pearson, Samuel and Cosgrove, Tylor J and Jetten, Jolanda and Faasse, Kate and Hornsey, Matthew J},
title = {Rejecting conspiracies doesn't necessarily mean that you're smart: The relationship between conspiracy discrimination and reasoning ability},
journal = {British Journal of Social Psychology},
year = {2026},
volume = {65},
number = {4},
doi = {10.1111/bjso.70117}
}
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