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People are more Sceptical of others' public virtue motivations than their own in separate (but not joint) evaluations

Kyle Fiore Law iD, Jordan Wylie iD, Gordon Kraft-Todd iD, Nathan Liang iD, Liane Young, Stylianos Syropoulos iD

British Journal of Social Psychology · 2025

DOI: 10.1111/bjso.70014 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift British Journal of Social Psychology, 2025. Verfasst von Kyle Fiore Law und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Sustainability, College of Global Futures, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Motivation, Morals, Virtues, Social Perception. Die Arbeit nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: John Templeton Foundation.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Public acts of virtue can promote prosocial norms yet are often met with moral scepticism – a phenomenon known as virtue discounting. What psychological processes might underlie people's propensity to both discount others' public virtue and also engage in it themselves? We examine one possible explanation: whether people expect their own public virtuous behaviour to be judged more favourably than others' similar actions. Across four pre‐registered studies ( N = 2511), we tested for self‐serving asymmetries in moral expectations. In three between‐subjects experiments, participants either anticipated how others would evaluate their own actions (meta‐perceptions) or judged the actions of another person (third‐party judgements). Study 1 found no asymmetry in moral goodness. But in Studies 2 and 3, participants expected their own public virtue to be judged as more principled (and more morally good, in Study 2), less reputation‐driven, and more trustworthy. Study 3 showed these asymmetries held across multiple perspectives. In contrast, Study 4 used a within‐subjects design and found that self‐serving asymmetries disappeared when judgements were made side by side. Together, these findings clarify how self‐enhancement shapes moral expectations under naturalistic conditions and extend research on moral self‐enhancement beyond trait judgements to public virtue and its perceived motivation.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

MotivationMoralsVirtuesSocial PerceptionJudgmentHumansFemaleMaleAdultYoung AdultMiddle AgedAdolescent

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

moralitymotivationreputationsocial perceptionvirtue discounting

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Sustainability, College of Global Futures, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA.
  • Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA.
  • Ker-Twang, Miami, Florida, USA.
  • Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA.
  • The Schiller Institute for Integrated Science and Society, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA.

ORCID-Profile: Kyle Fiore Law, Jordan Wylie, Gordon Kraft-Todd, Nathan Liang, Stylianos Syropoulos

Förderung

  • John Templeton Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Law, K. F., Wylie, J., Kraft-Todd, G., Liang, N., Young, L., & Syropoulos, S. (2025). People are more Sceptical of others' public virtue motivations than their own in separate (but not joint) evaluations. British Journal of Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70014

Vancouver

Law KF, Wylie J, Kraft-Todd G, Liang N, Young L, Syropoulos S. People are more Sceptical of others' public virtue motivations than their own in separate (but not joint) evaluations. British Journal of Social Psychology. 2025. doi:10.1111/bjso.70014

BibTeX
@article{Law2025,
  author = {Law, Kyle Fiore and Wylie, Jordan and Kraft-Todd, Gordon and Liang, Nathan and Young, Liane and Syropoulos, Stylianos},
  title = {People are more Sceptical of others' public virtue motivations than their own in separate (but not joint) evaluations},
  journal = {British Journal of Social Psychology},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1111/bjso.70014}
}
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