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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics?

Paolo Corsico iD

Bioethics · 2025

DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13393 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Bioethics, 2025. Verfasst von Paolo Corsico. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Public and Population Health, Institute for Bioethics and Health Humanities, The University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, USA. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Bioethics, Empirical Research, Ethical Theory, Ethical Analysis. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

If “no ought from is,” how can bioethics be empirical? Despite the widespread recognition that we can integrate empirical and normative, Hume's Law is still often claimed to pose logical limitations to empirical bioethics. Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics? I argue that we have reasons to answer no. First, I outline and reject two unverified assumptions: that Hume’ s Law, the fact‐value distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy are roughly the same thing, and that Hume's Law is an undisputed meta‐ethical principle which dictates how to formulate normative statements. I then show how the interpretation of Hume's Law as establishing a logical gulf between facts and morality—rather than as clarifying the logical rules of normative argumentation—is dependent upon a non‐cognitivist interpretation of the Is‐Ought problem. I argue that the version of Hume's Law that stems from ethical non‐cognitivism is what is problematic for empirical bioethics. However, other interpretations are possible. We have two reasons to reject the thesis that Hume's Law is an argument against empirical bioethics. First, conflating meta‐ethics and applied ethics is problematic. Second, a non‐cognitivist interpretation of Hume's Law is likely to constitute an argument not only against empirical bioethics, but against all bioethics that claims to be situated within ethical cognitivism, be it empirical or philosophical. Lastly, I present two meta‐ethical postulates shared by empirical and philosophical bioethics. I call them: (1) the “bridge” postulate and (2) the “ethical cognitivism” postulate.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

BioethicsEmpirical ResearchEthical TheoryEthical AnalysisBioethical IssuesHumansMorals

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Hume's LawIs‐Ought problembioethicsempirical bioethicsnon‐cognitivism

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Public and Population Health, Institute for Bioethics and Health Humanities, The University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, USA.
  • Alliance Manchester Business School, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.

ORCID-Profile: Paolo Corsico

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APA

Corsico, P. (2025). Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics?. Bioethics. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13393

Vancouver

Corsico P. Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics?. Bioethics. 2025. doi:10.1111/bioe.13393

BibTeX
@article{Corsico2025,
  author = {Corsico, Paolo},
  title = {Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics?},
  journal = {Bioethics},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1111/bioe.13393}
}
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