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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both

Ryan Kulesa iD, Alberto Giubilini iD

Bioethics · 2024

DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13285 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Bioethics, 2024. Verfasst von Ryan Kulesa und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Conscience. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Wellcome Trust.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest‐centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

ConscienceHumansPregnancyConscientious Refusal to TreatFemaleAbortion, InducedPersonal AutonomyEthics, MedicalPhysiciansRefusal to Treat

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

conscientious provisionconscientious refusalprofessional obligationssymmetry thesis

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA.
  • Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
  • Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

ORCID-Profile: Ryan Kulesa, Alberto Giubilini

Förderung

  • Wellcome Trust

Zitieren

APA

Kulesa, R., & Giubilini, A. (2024). Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both. Bioethics. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13285

Vancouver

Kulesa R, Giubilini A. Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both. Bioethics. 2024. doi:10.1111/bioe.13285

BibTeX
@article{Kulesa2024,
  author = {Kulesa, Ryan and Giubilini, Alberto},
  title = {Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both},
  journal = {Bioethics},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1111/bioe.13285}
}
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