Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection
American Journal of Political Science · 2023-07 · 67 (3) · 503-519
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12646 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal of Political Science, online erschienen am 25.08.2021. Verfasst von David Szakonyi. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does the passage of anticorruption reforms affect the types of people that want to serve in government? This article evaluates the effects of a common tool to fight corruption—financial disclosures—using data on 25,642 elections in Putin‐era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journalists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiting staggered elections, I find that requiring financial disclosures leads to roughly 25% fewer incumbents seeking reelection and 10% fewer candidates with suspicious financial histories. Greater media freedom and law enforcement capacity further increase the risk of corruption and tax evasion being uncovered, resulting in even fewer candidacies from those criminally exposed. Increasing transparency changes the incentives for serving in elected office, even in settings where other political motives may be at play.
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APA
Szakonyi, D. (2023). Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection. American Journal of Political Science, 67(3), 503-519. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12646
Vancouver
Szakonyi D. Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection. American Journal of Political Science. 2023;67(3):503-519. doi:10.1111/ajps.12646
BibTeX
@article{Szakonyi2023,
author = {Szakonyi, David},
title = {Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {67},
number = {3},
pages = {503--519},
doi = {10.1111/ajps.12646}
}
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