Observable Versus Unobservable Information Acquisition: The Differential Effect on Information Acquisition and Market Quality
Accounting & Finance · 11.08.2026
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.70275 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Accounting & Finance, online erschienen am 11.08.2026. Verfasst von Eunyoung Lee und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Historically, investors' information acquisition has been unobservable, but recent regulatory changes have made these activities visible to other market participants. Using this shift, we provide empirical evidence that investors strategically reduce their information acquisition when they expect their actions to be observed. This response aligns with market microstructure theory: investors aim to avoid leaving observable research traces that other stakeholders can exploit to erode investors' informational advantage and profits. These findings indicate that transparency‐oriented regulations can inadvertently discourage information production, weaken firms' information environments, and undermine market efficiency that these rules are intended to promote.
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APA
Lee, E., & Lee, J. H. (2026). Observable Versus Unobservable Information Acquisition: The Differential Effect on Information Acquisition and Market Quality. Accounting & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70275
Vancouver
Lee E, Lee JH. Observable Versus Unobservable Information Acquisition: The Differential Effect on Information Acquisition and Market Quality. Accounting & Finance. 2026. doi:10.1111/acfi.70275
BibTeX
@article{Lee2026,
author = {Lee, Eunyoung and Lee, Joo Hyung},
title = {Observable Versus Unobservable Information Acquisition: The Differential Effect on Information Acquisition and Market Quality},
journal = {Accounting & Finance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/acfi.70275}
}
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