Defined‐benefit pension plan funding: Does managerial ability matter?
Accounting & Finance · 2025-06 · 65 (2) · 1497-1531
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.13375 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Accounting & Finance, online erschienen am 16.12.2024. Verfasst von Surendranath Rakesh Jory und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 92 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the impact of managerial ability on defined‐benefit pension plans in US firms and find that plan funding levels increase with their sponsors' managerial ability. The finding is robust to various model specifications and control for endogeneity. Further analyses show that high‐ability managers make higher employer contributions and adopt more conservative and prudent plan assumptions and investment strategies, and that their pension management is value‐enhancing. We conclude that more able managers are cognisant of obligations toward pension beneficiaries and fulfil such obligations with better‐funded plans, which ultimately benefits shareholders.
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APA
Jory, S. R., Ngo, T., & Wang, H. (2025). Defined‐benefit pension plan funding: Does managerial ability matter?. Accounting & Finance, 65(2), 1497-1531. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13375
Vancouver
Jory SR, Ngo T, Wang H. Defined‐benefit pension plan funding: Does managerial ability matter?. Accounting & Finance. 2025;65(2):1497-1531. doi:10.1111/acfi.13375
BibTeX
@article{Jory2025,
author = {Jory, Surendranath Rakesh and Ngo, Thanh and Wang, Hongxia},
title = {Defined‐benefit pension plan funding: Does managerial ability matter?},
journal = {Accounting & Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {65},
number = {2},
pages = {1497--1531},
doi = {10.1111/acfi.13375}
}
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