The Effects of CEO Dismissal of Product Market Competitors on Audit Risk
Abacus · 26.11.2025
DOI: 10.1111/abac.70009 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Abacus, online erschienen am 26.11.2025. Verfasst von Yiqing Tan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 97 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper focuses on whether and how peer‐forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover affects audit risk. This research reveals that auditors charge higher fees for client firms when product market peers dismiss CEOs. Its findings are consistent with the prediction that the forced turnover of peer firms transmits product market‐wide risk, prompting auditors to heighten risk assessments. Affected firms are also more likely to receive modified audit opinions and to meet or beat the zero earnings threshold, as well as exhibit higher abnormal accruals. These findings demonstrate that peer CEO dismissals amplify audit risks. This research also reveals that the positive influence of forced CEO turnover on audit risk is mitigated by a better information environment and longer audit tenure.
Zitieren
APA
Tan, Y. (2025). The Effects of CEO Dismissal of Product Market Competitors on Audit Risk. Abacus. https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.70009
Vancouver
Tan Y. The Effects of CEO Dismissal of Product Market Competitors on Audit Risk. Abacus. 2025. doi:10.1111/abac.70009
BibTeX
@article{Tan2025,
author = {Tan, Yiqing},
title = {The Effects of CEO Dismissal of Product Market Competitors on Audit Risk},
journal = {Abacus},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1111/abac.70009}
}
EUVIMED