Lawyer CEOs and Strategic Disclosure of Litigation Loss Contingencies
Abacus · 2026-03 · 62 (1) · 95-132
DOI: 10.1111/abac.12357 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Abacus, online erschienen am 12.12.2024. Verfasst von Feng Chen und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using hand‐collected data, we find that lawyer CEOs, defined as CEOs with a legal education background, tend to make first disclosures about pending litigation cases on a timelier basis for litigation cases that end up with material losses than do non‐lawyer CEOs. However, for cases that result in immaterial losses, the presence of lawyer CEOs is not associated with optimistic claims. In contrast, lawyer CEOs are less likely to issue pre‐warnings prior to material settlements than non‐lawyer CEOs. We attribute the latter finding to the high perceived levels of disclosure proprietary costs in terms of ‘tipping one's hand’ to opposing counsels. These findings suggest that lawyer CEOs do not always exhibit conservative and risk‐averse disclosure styles.
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APA
Chen, F., Hou, Y., Richardson, G., & Su, B. (2026). Lawyer CEOs and Strategic Disclosure of Litigation Loss Contingencies. Abacus, 62(1), 95-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12357
Vancouver
Chen F, Hou Y, Richardson G, Su B. Lawyer CEOs and Strategic Disclosure of Litigation Loss Contingencies. Abacus. 2026;62(1):95-132. doi:10.1111/abac.12357
BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
author = {Chen, Feng and Hou, Yu and Richardson, Gordon and Su, Barbara},
title = {Lawyer CEOs and Strategic Disclosure of Litigation Loss Contingencies},
journal = {Abacus},
year = {2026},
volume = {62},
number = {1},
pages = {95--132},
doi = {10.1111/abac.12357}
}
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