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Do Politically Connected Firms Pay Less Toward Environmental Protection? Firm‐level Evidence from Polluting Industries in China

Lihong Wang, Shaoqing Kang, Hongjun Wu

Abacus · 2021-06 · 57 (2) · 362-405

DOI: 10.1111/abac.12210 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Abacus, online erschienen am 07.01.2021. Verfasst von Lihong Wang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study empirically investigates the role of political connections in corporate environmental spending. It employs a sample of listed Chinese firms from polluting industries within the 2010–2013 period. Our empirical results show that having politicians as directors reduces the magnitude of discharge fees. We also find that such reductions are more pronounced in firms with a higher ratio of politically connected directors (i.e., listed Chinese polluting firms that are privately controlled). This negative relationship is robust to various model specifications (e.g., a sample of polluting firms after addressing the sample selection bias and reverse causality without an increase in new investment). Moreover, we observe that the negative relationship between political connections and discharge fees is stronger in listed Chinese polluting firms located in more polluted regions. Meanwhile, a polluting firm's incentive to engage in environmental protection, measured by firm‐level environmental awards (incidents), alleviates (exacerbates) the negative relationship. Finally, the impact of politically connected directors on discharge levies is explicitly driven by having local officials and officials from the home province as directors.

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APA

Wang, L., Kang, S., & Wu, H. (2021). Do Politically Connected Firms Pay Less Toward Environmental Protection? Firm‐level Evidence from Polluting Industries in China. Abacus, 57(2), 362-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12210

Vancouver

Wang L, Kang S, Wu H. Do Politically Connected Firms Pay Less Toward Environmental Protection? Firm‐level Evidence from Polluting Industries in China. Abacus. 2021;57(2):362-405. doi:10.1111/abac.12210

BibTeX
@article{Wang2021,
  author = {Wang, Lihong and Kang, Shaoqing and Wu, Hongjun},
  title = {Do Politically Connected Firms Pay Less Toward Environmental Protection? Firm‐level Evidence from Polluting Industries in China},
  journal = {Abacus},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {57},
  number = {2},
  pages = {362--405},
  doi = {10.1111/abac.12210}
}
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