Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices?
The RAND Journal of Economics · 21.09.2026
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70055 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 21.09.2026. Verfasst von Jun Ma und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines bid requirements, where the government may cancel a procurement contract unless two or more bids are received. Using a first‐price auction model with endogenous entry, we compare the bid requirement and reserve price mechanisms in terms of auction failure and procurement costs. We find that, in comparison with bid requirements, reserve prices can reduce procurement costs and substantially lower failure probabilities, especially when entry costs are high or signals are sufficiently informative. Bid requirements are more likely to result in zero entry, while reserve prices can sustain positive entry under broader conditions.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Zitieren
APA
Ma, J., Marmer, V., & Xu, P. (2026). Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices?. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70055
Vancouver
Ma J, Marmer V, Xu P. Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices?. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.70055
BibTeX
@article{Ma2026,
author = {Ma, Jun and Marmer, Vadim and Xu, Pai},
title = {Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices?},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.70055}
}
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