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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Full Discretion is Inevitable

Wenhao Li

The RAND Journal of Economics · 17.03.2026

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70051 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 17.03.2026. Verfasst von Wenhao Li. Die Arbeit nennt 13 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article studies a dynamic project‐selection game between a Principal and an Agent with conflicting interests. Only the Agent knows what projects are feasible. In each period before a project is selected, the Principal imposes a restriction set. The Agent can select any feasible project within this set, thereby ending the game. The Agent can also stay silent, in which case the game will proceed to the next period. Importantly, the Principal cannot commit to her future restriction sets. I show that when the Agent is sufficiently patient, the Principal fully delegates to the Agent in the unique equilibrium.

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APA

Li, W. (2026). Full Discretion is Inevitable. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70051

Vancouver

Li W. Full Discretion is Inevitable. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.70051

BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
  author = {Li, Wenhao},
  title = {Full Discretion is Inevitable},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.70051}
}
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