Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2026-03 · 57 (1) · 245-266
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70047 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 26.02.2026. Verfasst von Junyan Guan und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that the signaling incentive would lower the seller's payoff and the probability of sale. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price could shut down the signaling incentive and improve both the seller's payoff and the probability of sale, which supports the prevalent use of secret reserve prices in practice.
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APA
Guan, J., & Xu, B. (2026). Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics, 57(1), 245-266. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70047
Vancouver
Guan J, Xu B. Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2026;57(1):245-266. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.70047
BibTeX
@article{Guan2026,
author = {Guan, Junyan and Xu, Boli},
title = {Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
pages = {245--266},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.70047}
}
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