Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2024-12 · 55 (4) · 684-718
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12478 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 31.10.2024. Verfasst von Simon Anderson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 38-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product range. The hybrid platform steers consumers toward its products by charging higher seller fees than pure marketplace. This “insidious steering” intensifies the larger the platform's product footprint. Hybrid mode harms consumers compared to pure marketplace unless fringe entry is sufficiently inelastic.
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APA
Anderson, S., & Defolie, Ö. B. (2024). Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm. The RAND Journal of Economics, 55(4), 684-718. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12478
Vancouver
Anderson S, Defolie ÖB. Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2024;55(4):684-718. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12478
BibTeX
@article{Anderson2024,
author = {Anderson, Simon and Defolie, Özlem Bedre},
title = {Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {684--718},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12478}
}
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