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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Herding in equity crowdfunding

Thomas Åstebro, Manuel Fernández, Stefano Lovo, Nir Vulkan

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2024-09 · 55 (3) · 403-441

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12474 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 14.09.2024. Verfasst von Thomas Åstebro und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We build a model of equity crowdfunding that incorporates the two major funding models: all‐or‐nothing (AoN) and keep‐it‐all (KIA). Both informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and rationally choose whether and how much to invest. The KIA solution turns out to be a reduced version of AoN without signalling. We test predictions using data from a leading European equity crowdfunding platform and find support. Results are consistent with rational information aggregation. However, negative information cascades may still appear. The AoN crowdfunding mechanism might therefore fail to finance a nonnegligible percentage of positive NPV projects.

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APA

Åstebro, T., Fernández, M., Lovo, S., & Vulkan, N. (2024). Herding in equity crowdfunding. The RAND Journal of Economics, 55(3), 403-441. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12474

Vancouver

Åstebro T, Fernández M, Lovo S, Vulkan N. Herding in equity crowdfunding. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2024;55(3):403-441. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12474

BibTeX
@article{stebro2024,
  author = {Åstebro, Thomas and Fernández, Manuel and Lovo, Stefano and Vulkan, Nir},
  title = {Herding in equity crowdfunding},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {55},
  number = {3},
  pages = {403--441},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12474}
}
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