Storing power: market structure matters
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2023-03 · 54 (1) · 3-53
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12429 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 14.02.2023. Verfasst von David Andrés‐Cerezo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 32-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: It induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare occurs under vertical integration. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewable energies.
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APA
Andrés‐Cerezo, D., & Fabra, N. (2023). Storing power: market structure matters. The RAND Journal of Economics, 54(1), 3-53. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12429
Vancouver
Andrés‐Cerezo D, Fabra N. Storing power: market structure matters. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2023;54(1):3-53. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12429
BibTeX
@article{AndrsCerezo2023,
author = {Andrés‐Cerezo, David and Fabra, Natalia},
title = {Storing power: market structure matters},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
pages = {3--53},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12429}
}
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