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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider

Gorkem Celik, Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2021-06 · 52 (2) · 314-333

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12370 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 26.05.2021. Verfasst von Gorkem Celik und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non‐manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only high‐valuation users, but also low‐valuation users may obtain positive rents—users may prefer facing a manipulative provider.

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APA

Celik, G., Shin, D., & Strausz, R. (2021). Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(2), 314-333. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12370

Vancouver

Celik G, Shin D, Strausz R. Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2021;52(2):314-333. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12370

BibTeX
@article{Celik2021,
  author = {Celik, Gorkem and Shin, Dongsoo and Strausz, Roland},
  title = {Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {52},
  number = {2},
  pages = {314--333},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12370}
}
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