Information, market power, and price volatility
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2021-03 · 52 (1) · 125-150
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12364 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 10.03.2021. Verfasst von Dirk Bergemann und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 17-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 18 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes.
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APA
Bergemann, D., Heumann, T., & Morris, S. (2021). Information, market power, and price volatility. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(1), 125-150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12364
Vancouver
Bergemann D, Heumann T, Morris S. Information, market power, and price volatility. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2021;52(1):125-150. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12364
BibTeX
@article{Bergemann2021,
author = {Bergemann, Dirk and Heumann, Tibor and Morris, Stephen},
title = {Information, market power, and price volatility},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2021},
volume = {52},
number = {1},
pages = {125--150},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12364}
}
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