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Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis

Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal, Daniel Piccinin

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06 · 51 (2) · 470-495

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12322 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 09.06.2020. Verfasst von Simon P. Anderson und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 60-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long‐run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks.

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APA

Anderson, S. P., Erkal, N., & Piccinin, D. (2020). Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 470-495. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12322

Vancouver

Anderson SP, Erkal N, Piccinin D. Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(2):470-495. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12322

BibTeX
@article{Anderson2020,
  author = {Anderson, Simon P. and Erkal, Nisvan and Piccinin, Daniel},
  title = {Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {470--495},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12322}
}
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