Information exchange in cartels
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06 · 51 (2) · 421-446
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12320 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 26.05.2020. Verfasst von Yu Awaya und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.
Förderung
- National Science Foundation
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APA
Awaya, Y., & Krishna, V. (2020). Information exchange in cartels. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 421-446. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12320
Vancouver
Awaya Y, Krishna V. Information exchange in cartels. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(2):421-446. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12320
BibTeX
@article{Awaya2020,
author = {Awaya, Yu and Krishna, Vijay},
title = {Information exchange in cartels},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2020},
volume = {51},
number = {2},
pages = {421--446},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12320}
}
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