EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Information exchange in cartels

Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06 · 51 (2) · 421-446

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12320 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 26.05.2020. Verfasst von Yu Awaya und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.

Förderung

  • National Science Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Awaya, Y., & Krishna, V. (2020). Information exchange in cartels. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 421-446. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12320

Vancouver

Awaya Y, Krishna V. Information exchange in cartels. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(2):421-446. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12320

BibTeX
@article{Awaya2020,
  author = {Awaya, Yu and Krishna, Vijay},
  title = {Information exchange in cartels},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {421--446},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12320}
}
Kostenlos starten →