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Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination

Guillermo Marshall

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06 · 51 (2) · 346-374

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12317 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 03.06.2020. Verfasst von Guillermo Marshall. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.

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APA

Marshall, G. (2020). Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 346-374. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12317

Vancouver

Marshall G. Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(2):346-374. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12317

BibTeX
@article{Marshall2020,
  author = {Marshall, Guillermo},
  title = {Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {346--374},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12317}
}
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