Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06 · 51 (2) · 346-374
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12317 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 03.06.2020. Verfasst von Guillermo Marshall. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.
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APA
Marshall, G. (2020). Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 346-374. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12317
Vancouver
Marshall G. Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(2):346-374. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12317
BibTeX
@article{Marshall2020,
author = {Marshall, Guillermo},
title = {Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2020},
volume = {51},
number = {2},
pages = {346--374},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12317}
}
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