Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-03 · 51 (1) · 32-58
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12305 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 09.03.2020. Verfasst von Chengsi Wang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 104-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.
Förderung
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Zitieren
APA
Wang, C., & Wright, J. (2020). Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(1), 32-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12305
Vancouver
Wang C, Wright J. Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2020;51(1):32-58. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12305
BibTeX
@article{Wang2020,
author = {Wang, Chengsi and Wright, Julian},
title = {Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2020},
volume = {51},
number = {1},
pages = {32--58},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12305}
}
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