Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model
Dialectica · 2015 · 69 (3) · 417-433
DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12119 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Dialectica, 2015. Verfasst von Bennett W. Helm. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 35-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
One central argument in favor of perceptual accounts of emotions concerns recalcitrant emotions: emotions that persist in the face of repudiating judgments. For, it is argued, to understand how the conflict between recalcitrant emotions and judgment falls short of incoherence in judgment, we need to understand recalcitrant emotions to be something like perceptual illusions of value, so that in normal, non-recalcitrant cases emotions are non-illusory perceptions of value. I argue that these arguments fail and that a closer examination of recalcitrant emotions reveals important disanalogies with perception that undermine the perceptual model of emotions.
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APA
Helm, B. W. (2015). Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model. Dialectica, 69(3), 417-433. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12119
Vancouver
Helm BW. Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model. Dialectica. 2015;69(3):417-433. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12119
BibTeX
@article{Helm2015,
author = {Helm, Bennett W.},
title = {Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model},
journal = {Dialectica},
year = {2015},
volume = {69},
number = {3},
pages = {417--433},
doi = {10.1111/1746-8361.12119}
}
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