Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure
Journal of Accounting Research · 2025-09 · 63 (4) · 1547-1581
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12610 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting Research, online erschienen am 17.03.2025. Verfasst von SEUNG Y. LEE und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.
Förderung
- Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond
Zitieren
APA
LEE, S. Y., & MARINOVIC, I. (2025). Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 63(4), 1547-1581. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12610
Vancouver
LEE SY, MARINOVIC I. Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research. 2025;63(4):1547-1581. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12610
BibTeX
@article{LEE2025,
author = {LEE, SEUNG Y. and MARINOVIC, IVÁN},
title = {Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure},
journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
year = {2025},
volume = {63},
number = {4},
pages = {1547--1581},
doi = {10.1111/1475-679x.12610}
}
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