Fraud Power Laws
Journal of Accounting Research · 2024-06 · 62 (3) · 833-876
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12520 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting Research, online erschienen am 24.02.2024. Verfasst von EDWIGE CHEYNEL und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 18-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.
Zitieren
APA
CHEYNEL, E., CIANCIARUSO, D., & ZHOU, F. S. (2024). Fraud Power Laws. Journal of Accounting Research, 62(3), 833-876. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12520
Vancouver
CHEYNEL E, CIANCIARUSO D, ZHOU FS. Fraud Power Laws. Journal of Accounting Research. 2024;62(3):833-876. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12520
BibTeX
@article{CHEYNEL2024,
author = {CHEYNEL, EDWIGE and CIANCIARUSO, DAVIDE and ZHOU, FRANK S.},
title = {Fraud Power Laws},
journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
pages = {833--876},
doi = {10.1111/1475-679x.12520}
}
EUVIMED