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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government‐Appointed Corporate Monitor

LINDSEY A. GALLO, KENDALL V. LYNCH, RIMMY E. TOMY

Journal of Accounting Research · 2023-12 · 61 (5) · 1633-1698

DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12502 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting Research, online erschienen am 15.09.2023. Verfasst von LINDSEY A. GALLO und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on‐site government‐appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.

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APA

GALLO, L. A., LYNCH, K. V., & TOMY, R. E. (2023). Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government‐Appointed Corporate Monitor. Journal of Accounting Research, 61(5), 1633-1698. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12502

Vancouver

GALLO LA, LYNCH KV, TOMY RE. Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government‐Appointed Corporate Monitor. Journal of Accounting Research. 2023;61(5):1633-1698. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12502

BibTeX
@article{GALLO2023,
  author = {GALLO, LINDSEY A. and LYNCH, KENDALL V. and TOMY, RIMMY E.},
  title = {Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government‐Appointed Corporate Monitor},
  journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {61},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1633--1698},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-679x.12502}
}
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