Firm‐Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives
British Journal of Management · 2023-07 · 34 (3) · 1387-1419
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12652 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift British Journal of Management, 2022-09. Verfasst von Ashrafee Hossain und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 161-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 152 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We document evidence that CEOs who lead firms that face higher climate change risk (CCR) receive higher equity‐based compensation. Our finding is consistent with the compensating wedge differential theory and survives numerous robustness and endogeneity tests. The result is more prominent for firms that are socially responsible, susceptible to higher environmental litigation and part of the non‐high‐tech industries. Furthermore, we find supportive evidence that firms offering higher equity incentives to their CEOs for managing higher CCR are usually better off in the long run via a lower cost of equity capital and higher firm valuation.
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APA
Hossain, A., Masum, A., Saadi, S., Benkraiem, R., & Das, N. (2023). Firm‐Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives. British Journal of Management, 34(3), 1387-1419. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12652
Vancouver
Hossain A, Masum A, Saadi S, Benkraiem R, Das N. Firm‐Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives. British Journal of Management. 2023;34(3):1387-1419. doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12652
BibTeX
@article{Hossain2023,
author = {Hossain, Ashrafee and Masum, Abdullah‐Al and Saadi, Samir and Benkraiem, Ramzi and Das, Nirmol},
title = {Firm‐Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives},
journal = {British Journal of Management},
year = {2023},
volume = {34},
number = {3},
pages = {1387--1419},
doi = {10.1111/1467-8551.12652}
}
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