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The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry

Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori

Australian Economic Papers · 2026-06 · 65 (2) · 190-201

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.70022 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Australian Economic Papers, online erschienen am 20.04.2026. Verfasst von Domenico Buccella und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This note studies the effect of production taxation on entry in a standard Spence‐Dixit model of entry game. Taxation reduces both the sunk cost thresholds that block and deter the potential competitor's entry. However, the interaction between taxation and market structure can have important policy implications: in fact, for appropriate ranges of tax rates, a contested monopoly can generate higher tax revenues and social welfare than a Stackelberg duopoly.

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APA

Buccella, D., Fanti, L., & Gori, L. (2026). The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry. Australian Economic Papers, 65(2), 190-201. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.70022

Vancouver

Buccella D, Fanti L, Gori L. The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry. Australian Economic Papers. 2026;65(2):190-201. doi:10.1111/1467-8454.70022

BibTeX
@article{Buccella2026,
  author = {Buccella, Domenico and Fanti, Luciano and Gori, Luca},
  title = {The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry},
  journal = {Australian Economic Papers},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {65},
  number = {2},
  pages = {190--201},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-8454.70022}
}
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