The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry
Australian Economic Papers · 2026-06 · 65 (2) · 190-201
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.70022 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Australian Economic Papers, online erschienen am 20.04.2026. Verfasst von Domenico Buccella und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This note studies the effect of production taxation on entry in a standard Spence‐Dixit model of entry game. Taxation reduces both the sunk cost thresholds that block and deter the potential competitor's entry. However, the interaction between taxation and market structure can have important policy implications: in fact, for appropriate ranges of tax rates, a contested monopoly can generate higher tax revenues and social welfare than a Stackelberg duopoly.
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APA
Buccella, D., Fanti, L., & Gori, L. (2026). The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry. Australian Economic Papers, 65(2), 190-201. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.70022
Vancouver
Buccella D, Fanti L, Gori L. The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry. Australian Economic Papers. 2026;65(2):190-201. doi:10.1111/1467-8454.70022
BibTeX
@article{Buccella2026,
author = {Buccella, Domenico and Fanti, Luciano and Gori, Luca},
title = {The Effect of Taxation on Strategic Entry},
journal = {Australian Economic Papers},
year = {2026},
volume = {65},
number = {2},
pages = {190--201},
doi = {10.1111/1467-8454.70022}
}
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