Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · 2026-03 · 17 (2) · 1535-1548
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2025.3629293 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2026-03. Verfasst von Sajjad Maleki und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Ph.D. Co-Fund WALL-EE Project between the University of Warwick, U.K., and CY Cergy Paris University, France, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack’s impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration.
Förderung
- Ph.D. Co-Fund WALL-EE Project between the University of Warwick, U.K., and CY Cergy Paris University, France
- King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
Zitieren
APA
Maleki, S., Belmega, E. V., Konstantinou, C., & Lakshminarayana, S. (2026). Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 17(2), 1535-1548. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2025.3629293
Vancouver
Maleki S, Belmega EV, Konstantinou C, Lakshminarayana S. Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 2026;17(2):1535-1548. doi:10.1109/tsg.2025.3629293
BibTeX
@article{Maleki2026,
author = {Maleki, Sajjad and Belmega, E. Veronica and Konstantinou, Charalambos and Lakshminarayana, Subhash},
title = {Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {2},
pages = {1535--1548},
doi = {10.1109/tsg.2025.3629293}
}
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