$\mathsf {SENTRY}$: A Compliance-Check Service for Dynamic Searchable Encryption With Sanitized Authorization Query
IEEE Transactions on Services Computing · 2026-07 · 19 (4) · 3042-3058
DOI: 10.1109/tsc.2026.3697760 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2026-07. Verfasst von Jinhui Li und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Australian Research Council, National Natural Science Foundation of China, Youth Science and Technology Talents Lifting Project of Jiangsu Association of Science and Technology.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Searchable encryption enables privacy-preserving queries over data outsourced to cloud services. Classical symmetric schemes deliver efficient search but largely assume a single-client setting; multi-client variants permit delegation yet typically treat authorization as an owner-local decision, overlooking regulations enforced by higher-level authorities (e.g., sector-specific compliance). In practice, limited familiarity with regulatory detail or operational lapses can lead owners to delegate search permissions that violate authority regulations, rendering existing systems unsuited to regulated, multi-client cloud environments. To address this gap, we propose two systems. First, we propose $\mathsf {SENTRY}$ SENTRY , a multi-client dynamic searchable encryption framework with a built-in compliance-check service via sanitized authorization . Its core is a tag-based sanitization protocol: the authority encodes prohibited keywords as hidden tags, and the sanitizer uses these tags to remove non-compliant per-keyword search permissions before they reach readers, without learning the underlying keywords. As a result, readers receive only compliant search capabilities. We then propose $\mathcal {F}-\mathsf {SENTRY}$ F - SENTRY , a forward-private variant of $\mathsf {SENTRY}$ SENTRY for settings where regulations evolve over time. $\mathcal {F}-\mathsf {SENTRY}$ F - SENTRY preserves the same sanitized-authorization mechanism and further adds forward privacy through a tailored constrained shiftable encryption, which binds search permissions and newly added encrypted updates to regulatory epochs. Consequently, permissions issued before a policy change cannot be used to retrieve data added afterward unless they are refreshed for the new epoch. We formalize the security of both $\mathsf {SENTRY}$ SENTRY and $\mathcal {F}-\mathsf {SENTRY}$ F - SENTRY and prove them secure under standard assumptions. Experiments under cloud-like workloads show that $\mathsf {SENTRY}$ SENTRY achieves regulation-compliant authorization with modest overhead, while $\mathcal {F}-\mathsf {SENTRY}$ F - SENTRY provides stronger protection under changing regulations at practical additional cost.
Förderung
- Australian Research Council
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Youth Science and Technology Talents Lifting Project of Jiangsu Association of Science and Technology
Zitieren
APA
Li, J., Xu, L., Liu, X., Yi, X., & Khalil, I. (2026). $\mathsf {SENTRY}$: A Compliance-Check Service for Dynamic Searchable Encryption With Sanitized Authorization Query. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 19(4), 3042-3058. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsc.2026.3697760
Vancouver
Li J, Xu L, Liu X, Yi X, Khalil I. $\mathsf {SENTRY}$: A Compliance-Check Service for Dynamic Searchable Encryption With Sanitized Authorization Query. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing. 2026;19(4):3042-3058. doi:10.1109/tsc.2026.3697760
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Jinhui and Xu, Lei and Liu, Xiaoning and Yi, Xun and Khalil, Ibrahim},
title = {$\mathsf SENTRY$: A Compliance-Check Service for Dynamic Searchable Encryption With Sanitized Authorization Query},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Services Computing},
year = {2026},
volume = {19},
number = {4},
pages = {3042--3058},
doi = {10.1109/tsc.2026.3697760}
}
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