An Incentive Framework for Task Offloading in Edge Computing Marketplaces Under Price Competition
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · 2025-09 · 24 (9) · 8492-8505
DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2025.3556516 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2025-09. Verfasst von Liantao Wu und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province, Science and Technology Innovation Program of Hunan Province.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
To efficiently execute tasks, computation resource requesters (CRRs) with limited resources can offload their tasks to nearby computation resource providers (CRPs) with spare computing capacity. These CRPs require appropriate incentives to compensate for their incurred costs when helping process the offloaded tasks. Although several mechanisms have been designed to incentivize CRPs, none of them have investigated the incentive mechanism considering price-setting and price-taking CRPs simultaneously. In this work, we propose an incentive framework for task offloading in the edge computing marketplace that includes both price-setting and price-taking CRPs. We model the CRR's interactions with both types of CRPs as a three-stage Stackelberg game to maximize the profit for both the CRR and CRPs. We prove the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the formulated game and further develop iterative algorithms for the CRR and price-setting CRPs to achieve the equilibrium. Through the designed algorithms, each CRP does not require complete information about the CRR and other CRPs. Extensive simulations demonstrate that offloading tasks to both price-setting and price-taking CRPs achieves higher profits for the CRR and price-setting CRPs compared to offloading tasks solely to price-setting CRPs. Additionally, the obtained SPE can achieve near-optimal social welfare.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province
- Science and Technology Innovation Program of Hunan Province
- Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program by CAST
- Shandong Provincial Taishan Scholar Program
- Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province
- Lion Rock Labs of Cyberspace Security
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities Shanghai Natural Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Wu, L., Sun, P., Wang, Z., Pang, X., Hu, J., Chen, H., & Yang, Y. (2025). An Incentive Framework for Task Offloading in Edge Computing Marketplaces Under Price Competition. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 24(9), 8492-8505. https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2025.3556516
Vancouver
Wu L, Sun P, Wang Z, Pang X, Hu J, Chen H, et al. An Incentive Framework for Task Offloading in Edge Computing Marketplaces Under Price Competition. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing. 2025;24(9):8492-8505. doi:10.1109/tmc.2025.3556516
BibTeX
@article{Wu2025,
author = {Wu, Liantao and Sun, Peng and Wang, Zhibo and Pang, Xiaoyi and Hu, Jiahui and Chen, Honglong and Yang, Yang},
title = {An Incentive Framework for Task Offloading in Edge Computing Marketplaces Under Price Competition},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing},
year = {2025},
volume = {24},
number = {9},
pages = {8492--8505},
doi = {10.1109/tmc.2025.3556516}
}
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