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Manipulating Voice Assistants Eavesdropping via Inherent Vulnerability Unveiling in Mobile Systems

Wenbin Huang, Hanyuan Chen, Hangcheng Cao, Ju Ren, Hongbo Jiang, Zhangjie Fu, Yaoxue Zhang

IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · 2024-12 · 23 (12) · 11549-11563

DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2024.3401096 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2024-12. Verfasst von Wenbin Huang und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Startup Foundation for Introducing Talent of Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, National Natural Science Foundation of China, National Key Research and Development Program of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Numerous mobile devices are equipped with voice assistants to facilitate contactless user-device interaction. However, the widespread availability of voice assistants also raises security and privacy concerns, as they can be maliciously triggered to perform voice eavesdropping. Although diverse attacks have been taken to manipulate voice assistants for eavesdropping, they exhibit deficiencies of limited attack scopes and conspicuous attack behaviors because they target specific voice assistants or require extra voice commands to activate them. To manipulate arbitrary voice assistants for covert eavesdropping attack, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of voice assistant implementation in the Android system and refine a universal workflow. Through meticulous analysis and experimental verification, we uncover an inherent vulnerability that in voice assistants across device types that can be awakened by an artificial faking Intent. Building on this significant discovery, we propose an attack termed VoiceEar. It leverages a malicious event generation file and a first-in-first-out Intent generation algorithm to trigger voice assistants within the normal workflow for eavesdropping, without voice commands. Finally, we deploy the VoiceEar attacks on 25 mainstream mobile devices, and invite 95 volunteers for eavesdropping activity perception testing. The results unequivocally demonstrate the seamless execution of VoiceEar attacks, with neither users nor devices awareness.

Förderung

  • Startup Foundation for Introducing Talent of Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • National Key Research and Development Program of China
  • The science and technology innovation Program of Hunan Province
  • Key Research and Development Program of Hunan Province
  • Hunan High Efficiency Computing and Application International Science and Technology Innovation Cooperation Base
  • Jiangsu Basic Research Programs-Natural Science Foundation
  • Collaborative Innovation Center of Atmospheric Environment and Equipment Technology

Zitieren

APA

Huang, W., Chen, H., Cao, H., Ren, J., Jiang, H., Fu, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2024). Manipulating Voice Assistants Eavesdropping via Inherent Vulnerability Unveiling in Mobile Systems. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 23(12), 11549-11563. https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2024.3401096

Vancouver

Huang W, Chen H, Cao H, Ren J, Jiang H, Fu Z, et al. Manipulating Voice Assistants Eavesdropping via Inherent Vulnerability Unveiling in Mobile Systems. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing. 2024;23(12):11549-11563. doi:10.1109/tmc.2024.3401096

BibTeX
@article{Huang2024,
  author = {Huang, Wenbin and Chen, Hanyuan and Cao, Hangcheng and Ren, Ju and Jiang, Hongbo and Fu, Zhangjie and Zhang, Yaoxue},
  title = {Manipulating Voice Assistants Eavesdropping via Inherent Vulnerability Unveiling in Mobile Systems},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {23},
  number = {12},
  pages = {11549--11563},
  doi = {10.1109/tmc.2024.3401096}
}
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