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Crossref

Contract Theory Based Incentive Mechanism for Clustered Vehicular Federated Learning

Siyang Wang, Haitao Zhao, Wanli Wen, Wenchao Xia, Bin Wang, Hongbo Zhu

IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · 2024-07 · 25 (7) · 8134-8147

DOI: 10.1109/tits.2024.3376792 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2024-07. Verfasst von Siyang Wang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars, Jiangsu Provincial Key Research and Development Program.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Clustered Vehicular Federated Learning (CVFL) can be used to improve traffic safety, increase traffic efficiency, and reduce vehicle carbon emissions. Therefore, it is extremely promising in intelligent transportation systems. However, in practice, it is difficult to accurately cluster vehicular clients with mobility according to data distribution. In addition, vehicular clients may be reluctant to contribute their computation and communication resources to perform learning tasks if the CVFL server does not give them proper incentives. In this paper, we would like to address the above issues. Specifically, considering the mobility of vehicular clients, we first propose a clustering method to cluster vehicular clients into several clusters based on the cosine similarity between the model gradient of local vehicular clients and the K-means method. Then, we design a set of optimal contracts specifically for the clusters, aiming to motivate them to select the optimal number of intra-cluster iterations for model training and give the closed-form solution to the contracts under the constraints of individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and task accuracy. The proposed contract theory based incentive mechanism not only effectively motivates every cluster, but also overcomes the information asymmetry problem to maximize the utility of the CVFL server. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed clustering method and the designed contract.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars
  • Jiangsu Provincial Key Research and Development Program
  • Natural Science Foundation on Frontier Leading Technology Basic Research Project of Jiangsu
  • China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
  • Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing, China

Zitieren

APA

Wang, S., Zhao, H., Wen, W., Xia, W., Wang, B., & Zhu, H. (2024). Contract Theory Based Incentive Mechanism for Clustered Vehicular Federated Learning. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 25(7), 8134-8147. https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3376792

Vancouver

Wang S, Zhao H, Wen W, Xia W, Wang B, Zhu H. Contract Theory Based Incentive Mechanism for Clustered Vehicular Federated Learning. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems. 2024;25(7):8134-8147. doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3376792

BibTeX
@article{Wang2024,
  author = {Wang, Siyang and Zhao, Haitao and Wen, Wanli and Xia, Wenchao and Wang, Bin and Zhu, Hongbo},
  title = {Contract Theory Based Incentive Mechanism for Clustered Vehicular Federated Learning},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7},
  pages = {8134--8147},
  doi = {10.1109/tits.2024.3376792}
}
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