Detecting Cyber Attacks in Power System AGC Using a Drifted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems · 2026 · 4 · 442-454
DOI: 10.1109/ticps.2026.3700087 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems, 2026. Verfasst von Mingqiu Du und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Automatic Generation Control (AGC) system, reliant on real-time measurements over communication networks, is susceptible to stealthy false data injection attacks (FDIAs), risking equipment damage and economic losses. We propose a robust FDIA detection method using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of a drifted multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process. Independent of load observability, in various cyberattack scenarios, the proposed FDIA detection method delivers accurate and rapid detection of sophisticated FDIAs, outperforming traditional unknown input observer (UIO) methods, which miss detections, and Long Short-Term Memory Autoencoder (LSTM-AE) approaches, which suffer from prolonged detection times.
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APA
Du, M., Wang, X., & Guo, Q. (2026). Detecting Cyber Attacks in Power System AGC Using a Drifted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems, 4, 442-454. https://doi.org/10.1109/ticps.2026.3700087
Vancouver
Du M, Wang X, Guo Q. Detecting Cyber Attacks in Power System AGC Using a Drifted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems. 2026;4:442-454. doi:10.1109/ticps.2026.3700087
BibTeX
@article{Du2026,
author = {Du, Mingqiu and Wang, Xiaozhe and Guo, Qinglai},
title = {Detecting Cyber Attacks in Power System AGC Using a Drifted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems},
year = {2026},
volume = {4},
pages = {442--454},
doi = {10.1109/ticps.2026.3700087}
}
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