Fair Least Core: Efficient, Stable and Unique Game-Theoretic Reward Allocation in Energy Communities by Row-Generation
IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation · 2025-06 · 3 (2) · 170-181
DOI: 10.1109/tempr.2024.3495237 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation, 2025-06. Verfasst von Davide Fioriti und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
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APA
Fioriti, D., Bigi, G., Frangioni, A., Passacantando, M., & Poli, D. (2025). Fair Least Core: Efficient, Stable and Unique Game-Theoretic Reward Allocation in Energy Communities by Row-Generation. IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation, 3(2), 170-181. https://doi.org/10.1109/tempr.2024.3495237
Vancouver
Fioriti D, Bigi G, Frangioni A, Passacantando M, Poli D. Fair Least Core: Efficient, Stable and Unique Game-Theoretic Reward Allocation in Energy Communities by Row-Generation. IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation. 2025;3(2):170-181. doi:10.1109/tempr.2024.3495237
BibTeX
@article{Fioriti2025,
author = {Fioriti, Davide and Bigi, Giancarlo and Frangioni, Antonio and Passacantando, Mauro and Poli, Davide},
title = {Fair Least Core: Efficient, Stable and Unique Game-Theoretic Reward Allocation in Energy Communities by Row-Generation},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation},
year = {2025},
volume = {3},
number = {2},
pages = {170--181},
doi = {10.1109/tempr.2024.3495237}
}
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