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Collusive Bidding for Keyword Bundles With a Dual-Roled Principal

Jiayi Zeng, Peifeng Li, Hanlin Liu, Qiao-Chu He

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · 2026 · 73 · 2290-2305

DOI: 10.1109/tem.2026.3672885 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 2026. Verfasst von Jiayi Zeng und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 68 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Commission, Southern Key Laboratory of Technology Finance.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Motivated by the trend of platforms participating directly in their markets, we examine the dual-roled platform’s “unethical” behaviors in algorithmic keyword auctions. We propose an algorithmic mechanism, the optimal resource allocation under second-price auction, comprising a first-stage second-price auction and a second-stage market game. In the first stage, we analyze the distribution of surplus in the auction of an indivisible keyword bundle when collusive behaviors are permitted. A “nested knockout algorithm” is proposed at this stage, achieving the Shapley value. In the second stage, we analyze the reallocation of keyword traffic among participants through a market game and characterize the core of the resulting two-stage mechanism. Our findings indicate that the online platform may engage in untruthful bidding to inflate the market price and decrease the aggregate utility, leading to potential systemic market inefficiencies due to its dual role as both principal and agent, and “inside job.” Numerical examples from Google’s keyword click auction validate our model and theoretical predictions in real-world scenarios. Beyond the keyword traffic auction context, our results caution against “unethical” behaviors in algorithmic market design and provide policy guidelines for platform governance in general.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Commission
  • Southern Key Laboratory of Technology Finance
  • Southern University of Science and Technology

Zitieren

APA

Zeng, J., Li, P., Liu, H., & He, Q. (2026). Collusive Bidding for Keyword Bundles With a Dual-Roled Principal. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 73, 2290-2305. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2026.3672885

Vancouver

Zeng J, Li P, Liu H, He Q. Collusive Bidding for Keyword Bundles With a Dual-Roled Principal. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 2026;73:2290-2305. doi:10.1109/tem.2026.3672885

BibTeX
@article{Zeng2026,
  author = {Zeng, Jiayi and Li, Peifeng and Liu, Hanlin and He, Qiao-Chu},
  title = {Collusive Bidding for Keyword Bundles With a Dual-Roled Principal},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {73},
  pages = {2290--2305},
  doi = {10.1109/tem.2026.3672885}
}
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