An Auction-Based Bilateral Bidding Privacy Protection Scheme in Multi-Platform MCS
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 2026-07 · 23 (4) · 8388-8402
DOI: 10.1109/tdsc.2026.3683379 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2026-07. Verfasst von Bin Luo und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Key Research and Development Program of Shaanxi.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
With the advancement of smart terminals and communication technologies, the emergence of heterogeneous Service Subscribers (SSs) and diverse sensing demands has facilitated the development of multi-platform Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS) scenarios. However, unlike traditional single-platform scenarios, Mobile Users’ (MUs) bidding privacy is hard to protect in multi-platform MCS. Additionally, the privacy disclosure issue of SSs has not been well addressed. To tackle these issues, in this paper, we propose a bilateral, auction-based scheme to preserve bidding privacy in multi-platform MCS, thereby protecting the interests of both SSs and MUs. Specifically, since SSs and MUs strategically choose one another to maximize their utility, we construct the corresponding selection processes for both sides by taking advantage of auction pricing theory. We firstly design a user-oriented forward auction that integrates the 0-1 knapsack problem with the Paillier encryption algorithm to protect the bidding information of both SSs and MUs. Then, we employ the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to design a reverse auction that hides the bidding behaviors of MUs. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that our scheme can protect the bidding privacy of both parties while ensuring economic robustness. Extensive experiments on a real dataset demonstrate that, compared with existing works, our scheme enables both SSs and MUs to achieve satisfactory utility while maintaining low computational overhead.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
- Key Research and Development Program of Shaanxi
- Young Talent Fund of Association for Science and Technology in Shaanxi, China
Zitieren
APA
Luo, B., Yu, Y., Li, X., Ren, Y., Ren, Z., & Yao, Y. (2026). An Auction-Based Bilateral Bidding Privacy Protection Scheme in Multi-Platform MCS. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 23(4), 8388-8402. https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2026.3683379
Vancouver
Luo B, Yu Y, Li X, Ren Y, Ren Z, Yao Y. An Auction-Based Bilateral Bidding Privacy Protection Scheme in Multi-Platform MCS. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. 2026;23(4):8388-8402. doi:10.1109/tdsc.2026.3683379
BibTeX
@article{Luo2026,
author = {Luo, Bin and Yu, Yong and Li, Xinghua and Ren, Yanbing and Ren, Zhe and Yao, Yuchao},
title = {An Auction-Based Bilateral Bidding Privacy Protection Scheme in Multi-Platform MCS},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
year = {2026},
volume = {23},
number = {4},
pages = {8388--8402},
doi = {10.1109/tdsc.2026.3683379}
}
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