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Crossref

Defending PoW Blockchains Against Game-Theoretic DoS Attacks: A Rational Strategy Analysis

Zhijun Wu, Hanwen Xu, Zhiquan Liu, Meng Yue, Yanrong Lu

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 2026-05 · 23 (3) · 7143-7156

DOI: 10.1109/tdsc.2026.3671880 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2026-05. Verfasst von Zhijun Wu und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Tianjin Natural Science Foundation Project.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Game-theoretic denial-of-service (GDoS) attacks exploit rational miners’ incentives to degrade the throughput and security of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains, even when the attacker controls less than 20% of the total hash power. Existing defenses commonly rely on protocol modifications, which risk hard forks and destabilize the system. This paper presents the first rational, protocol-preserving defense against GDoS attacks. We formalize GDoS by unifying selfish-mining-based and blockchain-based denial-of-service variants under a common definition, and establish its theoretical foundation through a dynamic game model with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Unlike prior protocol-level defenses, our strategy maintains consensus integrity without introducing any changes to PoW. We propose a cooperative hash-power hopping mechanism in which miners temporarily reallocate hash power to larger pools when under attack to preserve expected payoffs and suppress attacker incentives. To quantify miner utilities under different strategies, we develop a combined game-theoretic and Markov-chain analytical framework and derive closed-form critical profitability thresholds. Simulations calibrated to real-world Bitcoin hash-power distributions show that the proposed strategy reduces attacker revenue gains by more than 20% and prevents throughput degradation across the entire attack range. These results demonstrate that rational, incentive-compatible cooperation can effectively strengthen PoW blockchains against emerging strategic threats.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Tianjin Natural Science Foundation Project

Zitieren

APA

Wu, Z., Xu, H., Liu, Z., Yue, M., & Lu, Y. (2026). Defending PoW Blockchains Against Game-Theoretic DoS Attacks: A Rational Strategy Analysis. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 23(3), 7143-7156. https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2026.3671880

Vancouver

Wu Z, Xu H, Liu Z, Yue M, Lu Y. Defending PoW Blockchains Against Game-Theoretic DoS Attacks: A Rational Strategy Analysis. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. 2026;23(3):7143-7156. doi:10.1109/tdsc.2026.3671880

BibTeX
@article{Wu2026,
  author = {Wu, Zhijun and Xu, Hanwen and Liu, Zhiquan and Yue, Meng and Lu, Yanrong},
  title = {Defending PoW Blockchains Against Game-Theoretic DoS Attacks: A Rational Strategy Analysis},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  number = {3},
  pages = {7143--7156},
  doi = {10.1109/tdsc.2026.3671880}
}
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