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Timestamp Manipulation-Based GPS Spoofing Attacks on the MAVLink 2.0 Protocol for UAV Communication: An Empirical Study

Zack Colton, Alma Oracevic, Selma Dilek

IEEE Transactions on Communications · 2026 · 74 · 2564-2579

DOI: 10.1109/tcomm.2025.3644474 ↗

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Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Communications, 2026. Verfasst von Zack Colton und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: University of Bristol, a public university in the United Kingdom.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) are becoming increasingly prevalent in modern society, but are often insecure by design or limited in security capability due to computational constraints. The growing open-source UAV ecosystem has further enabled custom software and hardware development, frequently without adherence to established best practices. At the centre of this ecosystem is the MAVLink protocol, used primarily, but not exclusively, for communication between UAVs and their associated Ground Control Stations (GCSs). Since the adoption of MAVLink 2.0 in 2017, limited research has been conducted on its in-built security mechanisms. Although MAVLink 2.0 supports message signing, its signature scheme remains highly vulnerable. This study presents a novel attack that exploits GPS-based timestamp manipulation without the knowledge of a UAV’s secret key. The attack is evaluated in simulation, hardware-in-the-loop tests, and hardware environment tests. This paper also outlines potential countermeasures and briefly discusses the broader applicability of the attack to other GPS-synchronised systems beyond UAVs.

Förderung

  • University of Bristol, a public university in the United Kingdom

Zitieren

APA

Colton, Z., Oracevic, A., & Dilek, S. (2026). Timestamp Manipulation-Based GPS Spoofing Attacks on the MAVLink 2.0 Protocol for UAV Communication: An Empirical Study. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 74, 2564-2579. https://doi.org/10.1109/tcomm.2025.3644474

Vancouver

Colton Z, Oracevic A, Dilek S. Timestamp Manipulation-Based GPS Spoofing Attacks on the MAVLink 2.0 Protocol for UAV Communication: An Empirical Study. IEEE Transactions on Communications. 2026;74:2564-2579. doi:10.1109/tcomm.2025.3644474

BibTeX
@article{Colton2026,
  author = {Colton, Zack and Oracevic, Alma and Dilek, Selma},
  title = {Timestamp Manipulation-Based GPS Spoofing Attacks on the MAVLink 2.0 Protocol for UAV Communication: An Empirical Study},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Communications},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {74},
  pages = {2564--2579},
  doi = {10.1109/tcomm.2025.3644474}
}
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