EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Nash Equilibrium in Hybrid Impulsive Nonzero-Sum Game: A Weak Convexity Framework

Tong Liu, Bin Hu, Zhi-Hong Guan, Dingxue Zhang, Tao Li

IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering · 2026 · 23 · 9092-9106

DOI: 10.1109/tase.2026.3689967 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering, 2026. Verfasst von Tong Liu und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Guangdong Artiffcial Intelligence and Digital Economy Laboratory.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper investigates the existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player nonzero-sum differential games governed by hybrid impulsive systems, where one player applies impulse controls while the remaining $N$ players adopt piecewise-continuous controls. The proposed framework captures complex dynamics in which gradual adjustments coexist with abrupt interventions, with applications in traffic management, power dispatch, and emergency response. First, the necessary conditions for the existence of hybrid-strategy Nash equilibrium are rigorously derived using a variational method. Second, under traditional convexity assumptions, a sufficiency theorem for equilibrium existence is provided. By further introducing pseudoconvexity and invexity, a weak convexity framework with broader applicability is proposed, significantly relaxing the regularity requirements on the cost functions. Finally, numerical simulations, including a power system load dispatch case, demonstrate the validity of the theoretical results. Note to Practitioners—This paper investigates equilibrium analysis in systems that combine continuous evolution and impulsive interventions, commonly seen in power dispatch, traffic coordination, and emergency management. In such hybrid impulsive settings, multiple decision-makers interact through interdependent strategies—some adjust controls continuously, while others apply discrete impulses. The proposed framework establishes rigorous conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in these multi-player hybrid systems. Unlike classical approaches that depend on strict convexity of cost functions, this study introduces a weak convexity framework based on pseudoconvexity and invexity, extending applicability to non-convex structures that often appear in engineering practice. The theoretical conditions derived here help determine the existence of equilibrium strategies and clarify how system parameters and structural properties influence equilibrium formation. Practitioners can apply these results to interpret interaction mechanisms in hybrid control environments and to better understand equilibrium behaviors in applications such as power system scheduling, autonomous traffic coordination, and distributed multi-agent decision systems.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Guangdong Artiffcial Intelligence and Digital Economy Laboratory

Zitieren

APA

Liu, T., Hu, B., Guan, Z., Zhang, D., & Li, T. (2026). Nash Equilibrium in Hybrid Impulsive Nonzero-Sum Game: A Weak Convexity Framework. IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering, 23, 9092-9106. https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2026.3689967

Vancouver

Liu T, Hu B, Guan Z, Zhang D, Li T. Nash Equilibrium in Hybrid Impulsive Nonzero-Sum Game: A Weak Convexity Framework. IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering. 2026;23:9092-9106. doi:10.1109/tase.2026.3689967

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Tong and Hu, Bin and Guan, Zhi-Hong and Zhang, Dingxue and Li, Tao},
  title = {Nash Equilibrium in Hybrid Impulsive Nonzero-Sum Game: A Weak Convexity Framework},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  pages = {9092--9106},
  doi = {10.1109/tase.2026.3689967}
}
Kostenlos starten →