EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Systematization of Knowledge on Air-Gap Attacks and Defense Metrics: A Cyber Kill Chain Perspective

Bonn Park, JiEun Lee, JiHo Lee, Tarik Taleb, JaeSeung Song

IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society · 2026 · 7 · 1646-1665

DOI: 10.1109/ojcs.2026.3741690 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society, 2026. Verfasst von Bonn Park und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Federal Ministry of Research, Technology, and Space, European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, National Research Foundation of Korea.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) consolidates research on air-gap attacks and defenses through a Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) perspective. We (i) classify physical-layer channels into three operational groups: electrical and electromagnetic (including radio-frequency emissions, optical signaling, and power-line conduction), mechanical (including airborne acoustic signals and structure-borne vibration), and thermal, (ii) analyze malware behaviors observed in isolated and industrial control system (ICS) environments, and (iii) align defense strategies with attack stages via an Air-Gap Cyber Kill Chain (ACKC) and its accompanying Defense Matrix. Compared with prior surveys that emphasized single channels or ad-hoc demonstrations, our SoK models the entire attack process—from infiltration to trigger-based execution and exfiltration—highlighting operational prerequisites and potential defender intervention points. We clarify the notion of an “air-gap attack” relative to existing definitions and identify three core research gaps: fragmented cross-domain coverage, absence of quantitative detection metrics, and limited information technology (IT)–operational technology (OT) integration. Building on these findings, we propose a unified, phase-wise mapping of offensive and defensive techniques applicable to closed networks. This SoK not only extends the CKC paradigm to physically isolated environments but also provides a metric-informed framework and a proposed reference evaluation configuration for future empirical studies. The contribution is analytical; this SoK does not report a new empirical defense benchmark or establish a standardized evaluation procedure.

Förderung

  • Federal Ministry of Research, Technology, and Space
  • European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme
  • National Research Foundation of Korea
  • Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation

Zitieren

APA

Park, B., Lee, J., Lee, J., Taleb, T., & Song, J. (2026). Systematization of Knowledge on Air-Gap Attacks and Defense Metrics: A Cyber Kill Chain Perspective. IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society, 7, 1646-1665. https://doi.org/10.1109/ojcs.2026.3741690

Vancouver

Park B, Lee J, Lee J, Taleb T, Song J. Systematization of Knowledge on Air-Gap Attacks and Defense Metrics: A Cyber Kill Chain Perspective. IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society. 2026;7:1646-1665. doi:10.1109/ojcs.2026.3741690

BibTeX
@article{Park2026,
  author = {Park, Bonn and Lee, JiEun and Lee, JiHo and Taleb, Tarik and Song, JaeSeung},
  title = {Systematization of Knowledge on Air-Gap Attacks and Defense Metrics: A Cyber Kill Chain Perspective},
  journal = {IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {7},
  pages = {1646--1665},
  doi = {10.1109/ojcs.2026.3741690}
}
Kostenlos starten →