Living Off the LLM: How LLMs Will Change Adversary Tactics
IEEE Security & Privacy · 2026-05 · 24 (3) · 15-20
DOI: 10.1109/msec.2026.3659035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Security & Privacy, 2026-05. Verfasst von Sean Oesch und 3 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In living-off-the-land (LOTL) attacks, malicious actors use legitimate tools and processes already present on a system to avoid detection. This article examines how threat actors will leverage on-device large language models into LOTL attack pipelines and how to mitigate this threat.
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APA
Oesch, S., Hutchins, J., Kurian, K., & Koch, L. (2026). Living Off the LLM: How LLMs Will Change Adversary Tactics. IEEE Security & Privacy, 24(3), 15-20. https://doi.org/10.1109/msec.2026.3659035
Vancouver
Oesch S, Hutchins J, Kurian K, Koch L. Living Off the LLM: How LLMs Will Change Adversary Tactics. IEEE Security & Privacy. 2026;24(3):15-20. doi:10.1109/msec.2026.3659035
BibTeX
@article{Oesch2026,
author = {Oesch, Sean and Hutchins, Jack and Kurian, Kevin and Koch, Luke},
title = {Living Off the LLM: How LLMs Will Change Adversary Tactics},
journal = {IEEE Security & Privacy},
year = {2026},
volume = {24},
number = {3},
pages = {15--20},
doi = {10.1109/msec.2026.3659035}
}
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