Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86
IEEE Micro · 2023-07 · 43 (4) · 19-27
DOI: 10.1109/mm.2023.3274619 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Micro, 2023-07. Verfasst von Yingchen Wang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 8 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Power side-channel attacks exploit data-dependent variations in a CPU’s power consumption to leak secrets. In this article, we show that on modern CPUs, power side-channel attacks can be turned into timing attacks that can be mounted without access to any power measurement interface. This discovery exploits how, under certain circumstances, the dynamic frequency scaling of modern x86 CPU depends on the current power consumption (and hence, data). We demonstrate that this “frequency side channel” is a real threat to the security of cryptographic software. First, we reverse engineer the dependency between data, power, and frequency on a modern x86 CPU—finding, among other things, that differences as small as a set bit’s position in a word can be distinguished through frequency changes. Second, we describe a novel chosen-ciphertext attack against (constant-time implementations of) supersingular isogeny key encapsulation that allows full key extraction via remote timing.
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APA
Wang, Y., Paccagnella, R., He, E. T., Shacham, H., Fletcher, C. W., & Kohlbrenner, D. (2023). Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86. IEEE Micro, 43(4), 19-27. https://doi.org/10.1109/mm.2023.3274619
Vancouver
Wang Y, Paccagnella R, He ET, Shacham H, Fletcher CW, Kohlbrenner D. Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86. IEEE Micro. 2023;43(4):19-27. doi:10.1109/mm.2023.3274619
BibTeX
@article{Wang2023,
author = {Wang, Yingchen and Paccagnella, Riccardo and He, Elizabeth Tang and Shacham, Hovav and Fletcher, Christopher W. and Kohlbrenner, David},
title = {Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86},
journal = {IEEE Micro},
year = {2023},
volume = {43},
number = {4},
pages = {19--27},
doi = {10.1109/mm.2023.3274619}
}
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