A Mixed H 2 / H ∞ Incentive Stackelberg Defense Strategy for FDI Attacks
IEEE Control Systems Letters · 2026 · 10 · 655-660
DOI: 10.1109/lcsys.2026.3701413 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Control Systems Letters, 2026. Verfasst von Hiromu Ozai und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 12 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This letter develops an incentive-based mixed $\text{H}_{2}/\text{H}_{\infty } $ Stackelberg defense strategy to mitigate false data injection (FDI) attacks in networked control systems. An incentive-driven framework is proposed in which a defender designs incentive mechanisms to influence rational attackers and induce team-oriented defense behavior. To this end, existing stochastic mixed $\text{H}_{2}/\text{H}_{\infty } $ control results for discrete-time systems, which mainly rely on state-feedback designs, are extended to static output-feedback (SOF) control despite the inherent nonconvexity. By incorporating incentive mechanisms into a hierarchical game-theoretic framework, FDI attacks are treated as disturbance inputs, and both disturbance attenuation and performance optimization are achieved under a team-oriented defense strategy. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in maintaining robust system performance.
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APA
Ozai, H., & Mukaidani, H. (2026). A Mixed H 2 / H ∞ Incentive Stackelberg Defense Strategy for FDI Attacks. IEEE Control Systems Letters, 10, 655-660. https://doi.org/10.1109/lcsys.2026.3701413
Vancouver
Ozai H, Mukaidani H. A Mixed H 2 / H ∞ Incentive Stackelberg Defense Strategy for FDI Attacks. IEEE Control Systems Letters. 2026;10:655-660. doi:10.1109/lcsys.2026.3701413
BibTeX
@article{Ozai2026,
author = {Ozai, Hiromu and Mukaidani, Hiroaki},
title = {A Mixed H 2 / H ∞ Incentive Stackelberg Defense Strategy for FDI Attacks},
journal = {IEEE Control Systems Letters},
year = {2026},
volume = {10},
pages = {655--660},
doi = {10.1109/lcsys.2026.3701413}
}
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