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A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities in IoT Gateway Software

Diego R. Gomes, Fernando A. Aires Lins, Marco Vieira

IEEE Internet of Things Journal · 15.07.2026 · 13 (14) · 30303-30324

DOI: 10.1109/jiot.2026.3703749 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Internet of Things Journal, erschienen am 15.07.2026. Verfasst von Diego R. Gomes und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), I.P., within the scope of the Research Unit, Centre for Informatics and Systems of the University of Coimbra, Agenda “NEXUS–Pacto de Inovação–Transição Verde e Digital Para Transportes, LogÍstica e Mobilidade” through Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (PRR).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Internet of Things (IoT) gateways play a critical role in interconnecting heterogeneous devices, local networks, and cloud infrastructures. Vulnerabilities affecting these devices pose significant security risks. Despite this relevance, existing studies primarily focus on generic IoT assets, leading to high false-positive rates, incomplete coverage, and limited insight into root causes of vulnerabilities in IoT gateways. This article presents a comprehensive empirical study of security vulnerabilities in IoT gateway software, supported by a systematic methodology for asset identification and validation. This work offers the first curated dataset focused exclusively on IoT gateways, comprising 483 validated Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) obtained through iterative glossary refinement, automated vulnerability collection, and expert adjudication supported by explicit scope criteria and a full-consensus acceptance protocol. The dataset is mapped to the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)-1000 Research View, enabling hierarchical root-cause traversal for 80.3% of the vulnerabilities. The empirical analysis reveals a high-risk vulnerability profile, with most issues affecting operating-system-level components and scoring high or critical severity. The results identify improper control of resources (CWE-664), improper neutralization (CWE-707), and improper access control (CWE-284) as the dominant root causes across IoT gateways. A qualitative decomposition of these three pillars reveals recurring concrete weaknesses (buffer overflows, OS command injection, and missing authentication for critical functions) that individually account for the majority of high-severity exploitation outcomes. These findings reveal systemic weaknesses in gateway software stacks and development practices, offering insights to improve the architectural resilience and secure design of IoT gateway platforms.

Förderung

  • Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), I.P., within the scope of the Research Unit
  • Centre for Informatics and Systems of the University of Coimbra
  • Agenda “NEXUS–Pacto de Inovação–Transição Verde e Digital Para Transportes, LogÍstica e Mobilidade” through Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (PRR)

Zitieren

APA

Gomes, D. R., Lins, F. A. A., & Vieira, M. (2026). A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities in IoT Gateway Software. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 13(14), 30303-30324. https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3703749

Vancouver

Gomes DR, Lins FAA, Vieira M. A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities in IoT Gateway Software. IEEE Internet of Things Journal. 2026;13(14):30303-30324. doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3703749

BibTeX
@article{Gomes2026,
  author = {Gomes, Diego R. and Lins, Fernando A. Aires and Vieira, Marco},
  title = {A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities in IoT Gateway Software},
  journal = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {13},
  number = {14},
  pages = {30303--30324},
  doi = {10.1109/jiot.2026.3703749}
}
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