Attack Scenarios and Security Analysis of a Blockchain and PUF-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Wireless Medical Sensor Networks
IEEE Internet of Things Journal · 01.12.2025 · 12 (23) · 51010-51025
DOI: 10.1109/jiot.2025.3612005 ↗Kurz gefasst
Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift IEEE Internet of Things Journal, erschienen am 01.12.2025. Verfasst von Milica Knežević und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 70 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation, Republic of Serbia, Shandong Provincial Key Research and Development Program, New 20 Project of Higher Education of Jinan, China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs), wearable or implantable sensors are used to collect vital body parameters, allowing remote monitoring and advanced predictive and preventive healthcare. This involves transmitting patients’ physiological data, which are sensitive and should be confidential, over the network. Thus, ensuring the security and privacy of these data is one of the most important prerequisites for the successful development of healthcare systems based on WMSN. In this regard, reliable authentication protocols designed for this specific scenario are needed. In this article, we propose the most efficient attacks to date on the widely referenced lightweight authentication protocols for WMSNs—Wang et al.’s protocol (2022). This protocol relies on blockchain and smart contracts to address the issue of centralization and on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) to ensure advanced physical-layer security. Our attacks exploit the protocol’s vulnerabilities that stem from an inadequate use of the underlying blockchain component, unlike the previous attacks that require challenging conditions to meet, i.e., physical access to users’ mobile devices and specialized power analysis techniques. We introduce new attack scenarios and prove that Wang et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation, tracing, message replay, and session key disclosure. We validate these vulnerabilities using the ProVerif tool, thereby confirming the feasibility of the attack scenarios and refuting Wang et al.’s claims regarding the protocol’s security properties. In addition, we identify and discuss other design weaknesses in Wang et al.’s proposal that further undermine its overall security and practical applicability. Finally, we revisit the feasibility of previously published attacks on Wang et al.’s protocol.
Förderung
- Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation, Republic of Serbia
- Shandong Provincial Key Research and Development Program
- New 20 Project of Higher Education of Jinan, China
- Shandong Natural Science Foundation of China
- Pilot Project for Integrated Innovation of Science, Education, and Industry of Qilu University of Technology
Zitieren
APA
Knežević, M., Tomović, S., & Mihaljević, M. J. (2025). Attack Scenarios and Security Analysis of a Blockchain and PUF-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Wireless Medical Sensor Networks. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 12(23), 51010-51025. https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3612005
Vancouver
Knežević M, Tomović S, Mihaljević MJ. Attack Scenarios and Security Analysis of a Blockchain and PUF-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Wireless Medical Sensor Networks. IEEE Internet of Things Journal. 2025;12(23):51010-51025. doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3612005
BibTeX
@article{Kneevi2025,
author = {Knežević, Milica and Tomović, Siniša and Mihaljević, Miodrag J.},
title = {Attack Scenarios and Security Analysis of a Blockchain and PUF-Based Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Wireless Medical Sensor Networks},
journal = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
year = {2025},
volume = {12},
number = {23},
pages = {51010--51025},
doi = {10.1109/jiot.2025.3612005}
}
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